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Stabilization and openness: how strategies shape the markets 
The case of the US defense industry 
 
To analyze what a market is and how it works as a complex social object, the question of 
stability and uncertainty is central. A market is both stable and “open and fluid” (Djelic, 
Nooteboom & Whitley, 2005: 1739). Which are the processes that lead to a stabilization of the 
market and the ones that lead to destabilization, to creation of uncertainty? How do these 
processes combine with each other? Which actors lie behind? 
Economists and economic sociologists have tackled these issues. But two comments can 
be made. The first one is that for the last years, all the disciplines that have been interested in 
studying the market have focused on stabilization. In economics as well as in sociology, what 
has been highlighted is the stabilizing role of institutions (as noted by Aoki, 2005, most of 
studies start from the statement that “institutions matter”), the stabilizing role of networks of 
actors (Abolafia, 1998; Uzzi, 1996) or the necessary role of trust (Adler, 2001; Nooteboom, 
2002). Secondly, uncertainty of markets is rather seen as coming from exogenous factors as, for 
example, technology. A technological breakthrough shakes up ongoing strategies and 
afterwards new strategies are elaborated by market participants to stabilize the market 
(Fligstein, 1996; 2001).  
The present article aims, on the one hand, to show that the study of markets should 
highlight both the processes of stabilization and the processes of upholding or creation of 
uncertainty. On the other hand, it stresses the strategies of actors backing up both types of 
processes. Consequently, a market is dynamically shaped through the combined effect of 
strategies of stabilization and strategies of uncertainty creation developed by actors. That 
markets are both stable and open (even if structural conditions and exogenous factors play a role 
in stability and uncertainty) is explained by these strategies. 
In order to understand the way processes of stabilization and of upholding/creation of 
uncertainty are connected on a market and the way actors create and structure these processes 
through their strategies, the case study methodology has been adopted. It allows to study more 
deeply dynamic phenomena (Yin, 2003) through sequences of events. The selected case is the 
one of the US defense industry.  
Since at least 1945, this case is characterized by deep structural uncertainty. Actually, 
transactions are rare (States launch a new fighter program every 20 or 30 years). Yet when 
transactions on a market are neither repeated nor frequent, setting a price for the exchanged 
good or service becomes difficult with the absence of relevant reference. It stands as a major 
uncertainty, the one of valuation (Möllering, 2007). Therefore, as a counterbalance, strong 
 3
strategies take place to stabilize the market. The US defense market happened to experience a 
deep exogenous crisis at the end of the Cold War. The post-crisis period should therefore be 
characterized by extreme stabilizing strategies. The paper is focusing on this period and will 
strive to underline that the market shaping has been a process coming from both strategies of 
stabilization and strategies of upholding/creation of uncertainty.  
The following part will first examine how economists and sociologists see the market 
dynamics, especially the importance they attach to stabilization processes, uncertainty and 
actors. Some propositions will be set to guide the analysis. The paper will then present the case 
of the US defense industry as a deviant case, well fitted to study these propositions, and give a 
detailed analysis of the way out of the crisis. Finally, going back to the propositions, results 
regarding the market dynamics and its interaction with actors will be derived from the case 
study.  
 
Theoretical framework 
For the last years, economists and sociologists have been interested in the functioning of 
markets. They tend to demonstrate that market uncertainty is exogenous, coming as a crisis or 
triggered by the action of peculiar players, and that incumbents develop strategies to stabilize 
the market by relying on institutions.  
For traditional economists, the market stability is directly related to the number of 
competitors. When this number is reduced, when the oligopoly is a narrow one, actors can 
stabilize the market, even without explicit sharing of information and rules. Game theory is 
coherent with this approach: it actually explains that coordination is possible when the number 
of players is really small and much harder when the number of players rises (Philips, 1995). 
Under these conditions, a market‘s destabilization can only come from an exogenous shock. 
Nonetheless, empirical studies show that “spontaneous” stabilization does not work even with 
only a few players: when the number of competitors is reduced, on a commodity market, one 
can still observe the constitution of cartels, that is to say of rigid and elaborated mechanisms 
that aim to counterbalance the destabilizing forces (the case of the cement market is an example 
– Dumez & Jeunemaître, 2001). Therefore, indirectly, the presence of cartels in such markets 
tends to prove the possibility of destabilizing strategies, but this has not been studied a lot by 
traditional economics. 
Institutional economists (North, 2005; Williamson, 1998) have added the institutional 
dimension to the traditional economic perspective that tended to ignore it (in the Walrassian 
model, the only market institution, the auctioneer, is a fictitious institution). Institutions build 
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the necessary trust to ensure the functioning of markets. They themselves have a stability that 
guarantees the one of the market. 
There is an economic school that stresses uncertainty: the Austrian one. The question of 
uncertainty is not homogenous among the school. As regards von Mises (1998), uncertainty lies 
at the heart of human action and market decisions: “That man acts and that the future is 
uncertain are by no means two independent matters. They are only two different modes of 
establishing one thing (…) To acting man the future is hidden. If man knew the future, he would 
not have to choose and would not act. He would be like an automaton, reacting to stimuli 
without any will of his own”. Some authors insist on the fact that the market is in itself a 
process based on uncertainty. A chapter from Lachmann (1986) that is called “The market is not 
a clockwork” uses an image borrowed from Shackle, the one of a kaleidoscope: the market is 
both difficult to understand and changing. It is a fundamentally dynamic and uncertain process 
that is made possible thanks to institutions that maintain the indispensable order: “both 
equilibrating and unbalancing forces are at work” (Lachmann, quoted by Chiles, Bluedorn & 
Gupta, 2007: 477). For Lachmann (as well as Schumpeter), the entrepreneur is the actor who, 
through his choices, has the role to maintain and create uncertainty.  
Sociologists have also highlighted the structural conditions for the stabilization of 
markets. The degree of concentration and institutions stand as common points with the analysis 
of economists. But they add the power dimension – if it is on the suppliers’ side (Baker, 
Faulkner & Fisher, 1998). Then sociologists analyze how stabilizing strategies take place on 
markets. According to Fligstein (1996; 2001), dominant players, at first, share and impose a 
common vision of the market, a vision that helps them to control behaviors on the market 
(“conception of control”). Secondly, they manage to capture the State so that it defines 
“property rights” in their interest, thus creating profit opportunities. They also define products 
and services, qualify them so that they can be exchanged, again with an opportunity of profit 
(Coriat & Weinstein, 2005). Thirdly, dominant players can influence formal and informal rules 
defining what is possible in terms of competition and cooperation (it is the “governance 
structure”). Lastly, “[r]ules of exchange define who can transact with whom and the conditions 
under which transactions are carried out. Rules must be established regarding shipping, billing, 
insurance, the exchange of money (i.e., banks) and the enforcement of contracts” (Fligstein, 
1996: 658). Möllering (2007) takes up Fligstein’s approach with another perspective. He shows 
that a market can work only if three types of uncertainty are lifted: uncertainty on valuation (the 
fact that goods or services can be associated to a value which, through the market mechanism, 
will turn into a price), uncertainty on competition (an excess of competition can hinder the 
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functioning of a market as well as an insufficient level of competition) and finally cooperation 
mechanisms have to take place to create trust and limit opportunism.  
In a dynamic perspective, markets are seen, in normal periods, as stabilized under the 
effect of strategies of dominant players. They become open or uncertain only during periods of 
crisis triggered by exogenous shocks.  
Therefore, economists and sociologists have mostly pointed out what can lift uncertainty 
and stabilize markets, both on the structural side (degree of concentration, institutions) and on 
the strategy side (the way dominant players seek to stabilize the market). They see uncertainty, 
market’s openness, as essentially caused by exogenous phenomena and happening through 
crises, followed by a period of fluidity and new periods of stabilization. Only Austrians consider 
that uncertainty can be intentionally created through strategies of actors on the market, but they 
ascribe those strategies to a specific actor who is in practice difficult to identify, the 
entrepreneur.  
With an analysis of the case of the US defense industry, this article will strive to show 
that the shaping of a market is in fact continuous (and not punctuated by crises followed by 
stabilization periods), jointly made of strategies of stabilization and strategies of upholding and 
creation of uncertainty that interact and are not determined by specialized actors (dominant 
players who only stabilize the market and “entrepreneurs” who only create uncertainty).  
For this purpose, it will discuss the following propositions deriving from the theoretical 
framework:  
Proposition 1: The dynamics of stabilization and market’s openness is punctuated and 
looks like a crisis / emergence (more fluid and open period) / stabilization sequence. Counter-
proposition: Market shaping is a continuous process made of concurrent strategies of 
stabilization and upholding or creation of uncertainty. 
Proposition 2: Dominant players only develop strategies of stabilization. Counter-
proposition: Dominant players also develop strategies of upholding or creation of uncertainty. 
Proposition 3: Institutional actors are captured (regulatory capture) by dominant players. 
Counter-proposition: Dominant players do not necessarily manage to capture institutional 
actors (especially antitrust authorities which maintain or create market uncertainty).  
Proposition 4: Market actors who are not dominant players are passive or dominated. 
Counter-proposition: Other market actors also themselves develop strategies of stabilization 
and strategies of upholding/creation of uncertainty. 
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Methodology: study of a deviant case 
In order to analyze the questions previously mentioned, a longitudinal case study has 
been designed (Pettigrew, 1997). The above propositions serve as a “theoretical orientation 
guiding the case-study analysis” (Yin, 2003: 112). The analysis will pay particular attention to 
the study of competitive actions and reactions within their industrial environment (Smith, 
Ferrier & Ndofor, 2005), competitive actions being defined as “purposeful and observable 
moves undertaken by firms in order to improve their competitive position vis-à-vis their 
competitors in the industry” (Gnyawali, He & Madhavan, 2006: 511). The study of sequences of 
stabilizing actions and destabilizing actions (maintaining or creating uncertainty) and of turning 
points, epiphanies and apparent transformation associated to these trajectories (Dumez & 
Jeunemaître, 2006a) will help understanding how processes of stabilization and destabilization 
are simultaneous and complementary and what is the role of actors in those processes.  
How was the case selected? 
Among possible cases, the most interesting from a theoretical point of view are the “most 
likely cases” – those that look “over determined by existing theories” (George & Bennett, 2005: 
251) – that end up as deviant cases. The US defense industry was chosen as such: it looks like a 
“most likely” case (this market endured a deep crisis at the end of the Cold War and the crisis 
was followed by strong stabilizing strategies) that ends up as a deviant case (even in this 
context, one can notice that actors developed both strategies of stabilization and strategies of 
upholding and creation of uncertainty).  
Some more details can be highlighted regarding these features that make the US defense 
market an interesting one. 
According to Fligstein (2006: 251): “Markets are usually destabilized by some form of 
extreme crisis. This crisis can be caused by governments (either intentionally or 
unintentionally), by a severe market downturn, or by the emergence of new firms that are 
outsiders who claim to have a new way to structure the business. It is this situation that 
reintroduces fluidity into market arrangements and allows for a shake-up of existing market 
players and the possibility for a new set of rules to emerge to structure market activity.” The US 
defense market experienced such a crisis with the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold 
War (non intentional elements). This extreme destabilization was followed by two intentional 
changes operated by the government – a strong decrease in the defense budget and a redefinition 
of military missions (e.g. the ability to conduct two conflicts at the same time in two different 
locations in the world) – and contributed to a market slump and a reshuffle of the “conception of 
control” shared by dominant players (the development of new technologies emphasized the 
crisis). Actually, between 1989 and 1999, the US defense budget decreased from a third of its 
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volume. But mainly, the procurement budget (i.e. the budget for the development and 
production of weapon systems) is the one that most declined, loosing more than half of its value 
in ten years. This comes from the fact that procurement stands as more adjustable than human 
resources or maintenance outlays. So in ten years, the sector lost half of its volume (see Figure 
1). Even if the defense market has always been cyclical and has endured some important jolts, in 
that case actors could have had the feeling that cutbacks would be persistent and that previous 
budget levels would never be reached again. This constituted an epiphany: actors both from the 
supply and the demand (i.e. the Department of Defense – DoD) sides changed their 
representations of the market and their strategies. And still, even if some firms exited the 
industry, the big ones (Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, General Dynamics, etc.) have been on the 
market for decades, giving some evidence that stabilization strategies were and are still at work. 
 
Figure 1. Decrease in the procurement budget after the end of the Cold War 
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 Then comes another interesting feature of the market. Economists and sociologists insist 
on firms, on the supply side. It is the latter that stabilize the market. The case of the US defense 
industry is appealing because the customer is a powerful one (it is a monopsonic situation) that 
is in fact also a regulator (through the Federal Acquisition Regulation – FAR). This situation is 
extreme, but other market settings happen to exhibit a similar feature, even if it is less 
accentuated: Airbus or Boeing, even though they do not constitute a monopsone, are in a 
situation to impose rules to their suppliers; strong distributors probably as well. The US defense 
industry case was chosen because there is, on this market, a face to face between a powerful 
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customer and powerful suppliers, that enhances strategic initiatives from both the supply and 
demand sides.  
As a result, the studied case stands as a “most likely case”, meaning that after the above-
described crisis one should observe, after a period of relative fluidity (a shake-up of existing 
players), a clear stabilizing dynamics led by dominant players. Is it the case? More precisely: 
after the crisis, is there some fluidity and then stabilization? Was this stabilization carried out 
only by dominant players? To answer these questions and discuss the propositions, the paper 
will now analyze the dynamics of the way out of the crisis. It means understanding the 
processes through which actors have changed and how strategies have been renewed. This will 
lead to see that in reality, the way out of the crisis is made of both stabilizing and destabilizing 
strategies, and that these actions were carried out by diverse actors from the market. 
For the purpose of this case study analysis, we made some exploratory interviews with 
American analysts specialized in the defense industry as well as defense firms’ representatives. 
These interviews were completed with a systematic analysis of firms’ annual reports, 
newspapers’ articles as well as official reports and documents related to the defense sector 
(DoD, US General Accounting Office, now US Government Accountability Office, etc.). 
 
Case study analysis: the post-crisis period 
The case study emphasizes that the shaping of a market is made of strategic actions and 
reactions, which jointly create stabilization and destabilization. This is a dynamic phenomenon. 
Two successive phases can be contrasted.  
 
1. The restructuring process and the first market shaping dynamics 
In the depths of the crisis, the first strategic move came from the customer – the 
Department of Defense. In July 1993 the Deputy-Secretary of Defense William Perry declared 
he would foster the restructuring of the industry through mergers and acquisitions that had just 
begun at that time. He made it clear that the government would pay for “restructuring costs on 
contracts transferred as part of a merger or acquisition if the business combination was expected 
to result in overall reduced costs for DoD or preserve a critical capability that might otherwise 
be lost” (GAO Report on Defense Contractor Restructuring, 1998).  
This strategic action is ambiguous and difficult to interpret in terms of stabilization and 
uncertainty. On the one hand, the future market structure the DoD had in mind was clearly 
fewer and bigger prime contractors. This was supposed to improve efficiency in the 
development of complex programs. But this could lead to a reduced competitive intensity and 
market stabilization by dominant players. It was indeed likely, at the beginning of the 90s, that 
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the firms that would survive would be the big market actors. On the other hand, the DoD 
strategy introduced high uncertainty on the market: firms knew that an intense restructuring 
process was about to take place and that ruptures between competitors could happen, some of 
them creating a competitive gap between players. This first strategic move by the DoD therefore 
proves to be at the same time stabilizing and destabilizing. 
The market actually evolved as expected by the DoD: towards fewer and bigger dominant 
players (see Figures 2 and 3). Faced with the impulse given by the DoD, some firms exited the 
market, some specialized in the defense area and some chose a dual strategy – both in the civil 
and military activities. Those who exited and those who specialized, showing their commitment 
to the market, contributed to stabilize the market. The firms that engaged in the dual strategy 
tended to maintain the openness of the market; for, according to Chen (1996), non “market 
commonality” can lead to more aggressive competitive actions.  
 
Figure 2. Consolidation during the 90s Figure 3. Decrease in the number of 
contractors during the 1990-98 restructuring
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Most of the firms were acquired or chose to specialize. It is, for example, the case for 
General Dynamics: “The chairman of General Dynamics, William Anders, dismisses the 
rewards for diversification as largely illusory. His firm is slimming. The company plans to stick 
to four main businesses: tactical aircraft, nuclear submarines, tanks and space equipment. It has 
sold others, like the light-aircraft maker Cessna, and used the cash to strengthen its core” (The 
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Economist, August 8, 1992, “The Defense Industry Jettisons Its Excess Baggage”). Only one of 
the main actors, Boeing, chose a dual strategy. Following the merger with McDonnell Douglas 
in 1997, the firm’s turnover ended up being balanced between civil and military activities. With 
this strategy, Boeing prevented the formation of a “conception of control” (Fligstein, 1996), that 
is to say a vision of the market shared by actors (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of military activity for the 5  
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Concurrently to these “asset orchestration” strategies (Helfat, et al., 2007: 28), actors 
handled some non-market strategies (Baron, 1996; Dumez & Jeunemaître, 2006b). They tried to 
promote the idea that the specificity of the defense industry prevented antitrust law to apply. In 
1992, the Federal Trade Commission prohibited the merger between Alliant and Ordnance, a 
merger that would have created a monopoly for the supply of 120mm tank ammunition [FTC v. 
Alliant Techsystems Inc., 808 F. Supp (DDC 1992)]. The affair triggered a debate. The DoD 
gathered a Task Force, headed by a law professor who had already advised antitrust authorities 
in the past, Robert Pitofski (he will be later nominated president of the FTC by Bill Clinton). 
The report was delivered in April 1994 (DoD Science Defense Board, 1994). It resulted in the 
upholding of antitrust control on the market. Firms did not manage to manipulate the 
institutional framework applying to the market. On March 23rd, 1998, the Department of Justice 
prohibited the project for the acquisition of Northrop Grumman by Lockheed Martin (two of the 
top prime contractors), thereby stopping the restructuring process through mergers and 
acquisitions. This decision maintained a certain degree of openness of the defense market, 
necessary for competitive emulation.  
Besides, the DoD has been using another strategy to uphold uncertainty. In fact, it has 
kept on using the “winner take all” rule that allows to introduce some uncertainty to stimulate 
innovation, by giving an incentive prize for the firm which gets the production contract 
(Rogerson, 1994). The DoD acquisition process falls into different phases in the relationship 
with suppliers (design, development – source selection through prototypes – and production), 
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the number of suppliers being reduced as one goes along with the program. The division of the 
process into several sequential contracts introduces uncertainty on the side of firms, as they 
have no guarantee to get a production prize before the last phase of the program. Moreover, 
production contracts themselves fall into annual contracts (or multiannual, exceptionally), 
concurrently with the Congress annual oversight: it gives some maneuver for negotiation, being 
it for the DoD or for firms. As a result, despite the length of programs that tends to stabilize, the 
practice that consists in dealing sequentially with several contractors with a winner “taking all” 
in the end, allows to keep some openness. The combination of a reduced but open number of 
players and of the “winner take all” rule maintains these different players on a level playing 
field, which allows guaranteeing some openness in stability. 
What is the result of the whole process as regards the shaping of the market? 
During an interview, an actor expressed, through a metaphor, this market shaping 
resulting from combined strategies of stabilization and uncertainty creation. The market was 
compared with the US Major League Baseball. In such a championship, every team wins at least 
around one third of its games, and none wins a priori more than two thirds; consequently, the 
only uncertainty, reduced but present, concerns the remaining third part. In the same way, on the 
defense market, it looks like the consolidated prime contractors will now stay on the market, all 
of them winning a minimum of contracts and none of them being able to win all of the contracts 
(given the need to maintain the industrial base). They are regularly called to cooperate – prime 
contractors can become the subcontractor of another prime for some contracts (e.g. Boeing is a 
subcontractor of Lockheed Martin for the F-22, a US Air Force fighter), or two firms can be 
prime together (the last US Navy destroyer, the DDG-1000 Zumwalt, is for example co-
produced by two prime contractors). But uncertainty remains regarding the relative position of 
the different primes.  
Strategic interaction between the customer and suppliers thus led to a shaping made of 
stabilization and openness, where institutions acted to maintain this openness. However, this 
shaping has been questioned by firms’ stabilization strategies. The latter triggered a new 
sequence of interactions leading to new strategic answers in terms of uncertainty creation. 
 
2. Systems integration strategies and the second market shaping dynamics 
As said before, the crisis triggered by the end of the Cold War was a budgetary one, but it 
was also a technological crisis in the sense of a change of paradigm, due to the expansion of 
new technologies linked to the notion of systems of systems (or Network Centric Warfare – 
NCW). New information and communication technologies lie at the core of the development of 
systems connecting different platforms: according to the Pentagon’s Office of Force 
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Transformation, “NCW represents a powerful set of warfighting concepts and associated 
military capabilities that allow warfighters to take full advantage of all available information 
and bring all available assets to bear in a rapid and flexible manner”. For example, the US Army 
develops the Future Combat Systems program which consists in the production of a networked 
system of systems including a C4ISR backbone (central architecture), a ground soldier system 
as well as 18 systems grouped in 3 categories (manned ground vehicles, unmanned air vehicles, 
unmanned ground robotic vehicles).  
Dominant firms have seized this opportunity by trying to stabilize the market to their 
advantage and by getting out of the Major League Baseball model that remained too much open.  
There again, strategies of stabilization and destabilization have been combined. Actually, 
the DoD, which has been losing technological capabilities because of the decreasing budget 
(that led to more delegation), created a new type of contract: the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) 
contract. According to Bergey, O’Brien & Smith (2003: 1): “An LSI is an agent with the 
authority to acquire and integrate assets from a variety of potential system suppliers on behalf of 
an organization that is acquiring a complex software-intensive system. The LSI has the 
authority to contract with and manage other suppliers on behalf of the acquirer.” More precisely, 
requirements become a variable that the contractor co-defines with the customer, thanks to its 
capabilities. And the LSI can be responsible for setting itself the request for proposals and 
choosing the contractors. In a way, this strategy is clearly stabilizing. These new systems are 
highly complex and ask for firms to combine diverse capabilities: it means being able to define 
the customer’s needs, to technically design the system and later integrate the subsystems 
(simulation and test capabilities) and to organize and manage the subcontracting. The few firms 
that get a contract are likely to benefit from a first mover advantage with a lock-in effect.  
The Future Combat Systems (FCS) program embodies this change that affects both the 
process of definition of needs and the process of contractors’ selection. Regarding the definition 
of needs, it is important to understand that, with NCW technologies, the US Army literally 
needed to reinvent its identity and missions. In 2002, it chose the Boeing and SAIC team to 
propose a global solution allowing to link platforms, sensors, weapons and soldiers within a 
seamless and integrated network. Even if the program came from DARPA’s research (Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency), it was specified by the selected contractors, working 
jointly with the military customer. Boeing and SAIC had to transform the concept imagined by 
the US Army and DARPA into an operational solution. Regarding the contractors’ selection, the 
LSI has progressively built a network of 31 first-tier partners. 
As for the shaping of the market, several points can be highlighted. 
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Systems integration goes with a risk of an excessive stabilization of the market. The 
restructuring process already led to the constitution of a market with a limited number of actors. 
Systems integration could lead to the selection of three or four durably dominant firms.  
Yet the case study shows that the customer used the expansion of systems integration to 
develop strategies of uncertainty creation. For example, when the US Army decided to grant an 
LSI contract to both Boeing and SAIC for the FCS program, two new actors were thus 
introduced on the army market, to the detriment of the traditional first-tier contractors of the US 
Army, namely General Dynamics and United Defense. Whereas they previously had a direct 
contact with the military customer, they have become a partner-supplier of Boeing and SAIC. 
De facto, the DoD created a new type of actors, an intermediary between the customer – that is 
itself – and suppliers. It therefore opened the traditional playing field that was too much 
stabilized in a face to face between the US Army and its established suppliers. 
On the suppliers’ side, systems integration poses a challenge. The firms that manage to 
get hold of an intermediary monopolistic position between the DoD and suppliers face a 
problem: they have to adopt the same competitive behavior towards suppliers and their own 
subsidiaries (it is an independence of judgment capability – Dombrowski & Gholz, 2006). As 
they are vertically integrated, the customer can suspect them to favor their internal solutions. 
For that reason, they have to adopt some self-restraining strategies that prevent them to 
excessively stabilize the market at their profit. However, it is possible that the value chain is 
more favorable to subcontractors. So even if they manage to get hold of the highest position of 
the market (the new one of intermediary), it can also lead them to give up inferior positions that 
can be more valuable. 
Moreover, the superior position is not free from reversibility. In April 2007 for example, 
the US Coast Guards, under the pressure of the Congress, retrieved the LSI contract of the joint 
venture formed by Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman because of their inability to 
properly run the Deepwater program (a massive modernization program of the Coast Guards 
that was set up after the 9/11 events). The costs went from the initially predicted 17 billions of 
dollars to 24 billions “and has included problems such as failed encryption technologies, which 
jeopardizes classified government information, and boats rendered unusable due to buckling and 
cracking hulls” (Defense-Aerospace.com, May 22, 2007, “Defense Contractors Running 
Government: A Recipe for Disaster”). The government went back on delegation: after retrieving 
the Deepwater LSI contract, the Coast Guards announced that from now on they would 
internally ensure the management of the program by reincorporating this responsibility within 
the Coast Guards. Even though Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman are not completely 
thrown out of the program, they are still downgraded to a “classical” prime contractor role.  
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Going on with strategies recreating uncertainty, the DoD recently suggested to go back to 
fixed-price contracts in order to favor more firms’ efficiency. It looks like if there were a 
pendulum according to which, when there are too much costs’ slippage (on average, costs are 
underestimated of 20% – Report from the RAND Corporation, 1993), the DoD can go back to 
stricter rules to balance the situation. For example, the development of information technologies 
is giving rise to numerous technically complex and demanding programs for which the 
maturation of technologies is quite slow. It creates strong uncertainty on costs and time 
schedules, with a DoD knowing less about the program than firms do. Using fixed-price 
contracts is thus a way for the DoD to transfer some risks to the contractors. It stands as an 
incentive for them to be more efficient. For that reason, at the beginning of 2007 the US Navy 
asked Lockheed Martin to build its second prototype for the Littoral Combat Ship program 
under a fixed-price contract, following important slippage in costs and time schedules for the 
first prototype. This attempt to go back to fixed-price acts as a signal that the DoD can 
periodically mobilize to make the market more dynamic. The decision of the Congress to set up 
a price-cap for the costs associated to the F-22 program stands as another example of the 
strengthening of contractual settings. 
As for firms, they can play on their strong position to answer to these strategies of 
uncertainty renewal with strategies creating a new stabilization. Subsequent to the strategy of 
the US Navy regarding the use of a fixed-price contract, Lockheed Martin answered by refusing 
to take on more risks and the contract was eventually interrupted. This is related to the fact that 
it is very difficult to rightly anticipate the price of highly innovative programs (valuation 
problem), this price resulting from the power balance between supply and demand. 
The study of the development of systems integration strategies, which renewed the 
“conception of control” of the market, therefore clearly enhances the double dimension of the 
shaping. The stabilization can be seen in the formation of a new hierarchy of actors, through the 
monopolization by a few firms of the relationship with the customer and through the dynamic 
transfer of competences. Firms also develop some self-restraining strategies allowing the market 
to stay open. The DoD creates some uncertainty at the level of the traditional playing field 
where firms were too highly anchored, by creating a new position, the one of intermediary.  
 
Discussion and results 
We can now come back to the propositions and see what has been enlightened by the case 
study.  
At first, the dynamics that follows a strong exogenous perturbation is not univocally 
stabilizing (even if in the short run the crisis particularly destabilizes the market and accentuates 
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its fluidity, the latter does not disappear after). The supposed sequence – crisis / emergence / 
stabilization – tends to screen the intrinsically dual nature of the market process: actions that 
stabilize the market and actions that uphold or create uncertainty coexist in a complementary 
way.  
Then, who is carrying out these actions? Are some actors specialized in destabilization 
and institutional actors specialized in stabilization? On the contrary, the case study points out 
that each actor has some levers for stabilization and destabilization. For example, the DoD – 
both a customer and a regulator – can play with the rules of exchange by switching between 
fixed-price contracts (destabilizing) and cost-plus contracts (stabilizing); by selecting 
contractors according to the “winner take all” rule (that creates a beneficial uncertainty) and by 
sometimes using “compensatory” selections (stabilizing); or also by being selective early in the 
acquisition process (choice of a Lead System Integrator who will lead the program) or by 
keeping uncertainty until the choice of a producer. As for firms, they can share the same 
“conception of control” as well as keep some exit options; they can specialize univocally in one 
area or, on the contrary, surprise competitors by mobilizing their capabilities to enter new 
activities (cf. Boeing’s interest for the FCS program for the US Army). It is important to note 
that there are some sequences of actions, some series of actions and reactions. For example, a 
firm as Lockheed Martin took up a cost-plus contract and underperformed, far away from the 
initial target; the customer considered that this performance was caused by bad management and 
decided to turn back to a fixed-price contract so as to give an incentive for a better performance; 
the firm refused and preferred to stop the contract rather than accept to bear the associated risks. 
Therefore, one can conceive the shaping of a market as a double movement of both 
stabilization and upholding/creation of uncertainty, from actors who are parts of the market. The 
notion of stabilization is ambiguous and calls for cautious interpretation, it is more complex 
than Fligstein could let think. Some strategies can, at the same time, be stabilizing and 
destabilizing. Two types of actions are complementary: if a certain degree of stabilization is 
clearly necessary for actors to take part in the exchange (one only has to see the strong need for 
stabilization on the defense market, due to the intrinsic valuation uncertainty), a certain degree 
of openness of the market also needs to be maintained. The notion of openness, destabilization, 
upholding or creation of uncertainty, is a way to remind that stabilizing elements emanate from 
actors that could decide otherwise. Actors’ asymmetries are of course possible, but dynamically 
the possibility for change and reversibility is essential. It must be possible to go back and forth, 
that is the only way the market can let exchanges occur.  
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The notion of market shaping as we tried to support it helps to identify some critical 
points for the evolution of a market. In the case of the defense market, it can be argued that the 
actual trend is probably one of an excessive stabilization. Despite some strategies to recreate 
some uncertainty, both on the demand side (call for fixed-price contracts, creation of new 
intermediary positions) and on the supply side (self-restraining strategies), a market stabilization 
is taking place; due to the fact that firms are progressively getting some key capabilities that the 
buyer has dropped (it is a path-dependency dynamics). The government has to renew its 
capabilities to take on a role that is no more the one of an implementer but that rather becomes a 
role of overseeing (Flood & Richard, 2005). What levers could allow the DoD to get back some 
maneuver by creating new uncertainties? Chu & Waxman (1998), for example, think that the 
actual game is closed because firms are too specialized. They think that the DoD should give 
incentives for civil firms to enter some segments of the market by working with them (the 
knowledge of the military customer is one of the barriers to entry, probably more than the 
specificity of technologies). The solution would be in a modification of the framework for 
exchanges, of the required capabilities to be in the market, through a decrease of firms’ 
“defense-ness” (i.e. “the degree to which a firm has built the capability and competency to 
engage in business with agencies like DoD”, p. 38). It comes down to play on the openness of 
relationships between military and civil activities, so that “specialized knowledge necessary to 
do business with the Department of Defense [is] either easily obtained, or no longer 
differentiate[s] the defense and non-defense sectors” (p. 42). As for Dombrowski & Gholz 
(2006), they suggest to mobilize an independent expertise with no production activity in the 
sector, that is to say no industrial stake, but with some capabilities that the DoD lost and cannot 
exclusively leave to contractors.  
The notion of shaping as it was used in this article thus appears to be an interesting tool to 
analyze and predict in some way a market dynamics. It restores the strategic dimension of 
actions of market’s players, without over valuating the stability of markets as process.   
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